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Jiangsu has experienced impressive industrial development since 1949,
often achieving higher growth rates than China’s national average. None-
theless, rates of growth have fluctuated with distinct policy periods. In
‘‘Industry’s Response to Market Liberalization in China: Evidence from
Jiangsu Province’’ I analyzed the structure of industrial production and
productivity in Jiangsu Province to explore changes in specialization and
efficiency. This research covered the years 1952–88 and focused on
comparing the period before 1978, when Maoist regional self-reliance
was being promoted, with the post-1978 reform when many of the self-
reliant policies were reversed.
To analyze Jiangsu’s production structure, I used location quotients
for 29 products. The results showed that Jiangsu’s production patterns
became less specialized from 1957 to 1978, consistent with self-reliance.
In fact, none of the products in the sample showed an increase in special-
ization during this period. After 1978, however, 14 of the products ana-
lyzed moved toward specialization, showing a clear change in the pro-
duction structure.
To analyze productivity, I applied a simple growth-accounting
framework, using estimates of the output elasticities with respect to capi-
tal and labor based on Jiangsu data. With these assumptions, productivity
declined an average of 2.1% per year from 1953 to 1978, while it in-
creased an average of 4.4% per year from 1978 to 1988. These results
did not change substantially with alternative parameter assumptions.
Both the specialization and productivity results suggest that reforms had
a substantial, positive impact on Jiangsu’s economy.
The comment by MengHao Zhao and Paul M. Sommers addresses
the last section of my article, which compared state and collective indus-
trial productivity in the reform period.1 Series for both gross and net out-
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put were used, after adjusting for housing and inflation.2 Capital was
measured as the net value of fixed capital in each sector, adjusted for
inflation. Labor was measured as the total state industrial labor force in
the state sector, and employment in urban and rural collectives for the
collective sector.3 Since the small number of data points precluded my
own estimates of the output elasticities, I used estimates from a previous
study that found a capital-output elasticity of .309 for state industry and
.722 for collective industry.4 While this study used data from across
China, these elasticities are plausible for Jiangsu as well. Using these as-
sumptions, I found that productivity in collective industry increased an
average of 6.2% per year using the gross output measure compared with
4.1% in state enterprises. Using net output, however, I found that pro-
ductivity in state industry increased faster than in collective industry:
2.3% in state industry compared with 1.7% in collective industry. Based
on these inconclusive results, I suggested ‘‘caution in interpreting the
fast growth in collective industrial output as evidence that reforms have
made China’s economy more efficient.’’5
Zhao and Sommers apparently expect industrial productivity to be
higher in the collective sector compared with the state sector and so scru-
tinize why state industry appears to perform better with the net output
measure. They employ paired t-tests to show that collective output grew
significantly faster than state output with both the net and gross output
measures. Why, then, does the gross output measure show a different re-
sult than the net measure? As they suggest, the results are dependent on
which output elasticity is used. They show that if we were to use differ-
ent assumptions about the elasticities, we would get different results.
This, of course, is to be expected.
What matters is how one justifies choosing one set of assumptions
over another. Zhao and Sommers suggest using the same weights for
both state and collective industry. They first apply a .309 capital-output
coefficient to both sectors and then a .722 coefficient to both. Using these
assumptions, they are able to conclude that productivity growth has been
higher in collective industry, no matter which output measure is used.
They base this exercise on the assumption that resources used in the col-
lective sector would otherwise have been used in the state sector. This
assumption, however, is highly questionable. Many analysts have written
about how collective enterprise development has been largely accom-
plished through bottom-up initiatives, using household savings and re-
sources of local governments as the main sources of investment.6 It is
not at all obvious that the same resources could have been mobilized for
investment in the state sector. The economy was stagnating before re-
forms changed the rules that allowed the development of nonstate eco-
nomic activity.
Using the same capital-output coefficients for both sectors is also
questionable. Since collective industry is widely thought to be relatively
labor intensive compared with state industry, we would not expect that
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capital and labor would affect output in the collective sector the same
way as in the state sector. A higher output elasticity with respect to capi-
tal means that a 1% increase in capital invested in a collective enterprise
will lead to a higher percent increase in output than additional capital
invested in a state enterprise. For this reason, it is important to consider
the relative weights on labor and capital rather than simply to compare
growth rates of outputs to inputs, as Zhao and Sommers prefer.
Finally, let’s return to Zhao and Sommers’s expectation that growth
in productivity has been higher in collective industry than state industry.
To the extent that collective enterprises are subject to more market pres-
sures than state enterprises, this expectation is reasonable. But there are
a number of characteristics of the environment in which collective enter-
prises operate that might mitigate the impact of market pressure on pro-
ductivity. First, intermediate inputs may have increased faster in collec-
tive industry compared with state industry.7 A recent study by Jefferson,
Rawski, and Zheng shows this has been the case in their sample.8 Sec-
ond, there is much evidence of overreported collective output. Jefferson,
Rawski, and Zheng have shown that this factor is complicated and could
either under- or overestimate total factor productivity.9 Third, one of the
purposes of collective industry has been to absorb surplus labor from
agriculture. By one account, which deals specifically with Jiangsu, there
has been a ‘‘massive’’ shift of resources from agriculture to collective
industry.10 Fourth, collective enterprises tend to use low levels of tech-
nology, which would not be expected to be as productive as more ad-
vanced methods. All of these factors would work against higher produc-
tivity in collective enterprises. Finally, at least some state enterprises
have become more responsive to market incentives and have adopted
more advanced technology from home and abroad.
Ultimately, how much productivity has increased in collective en-
terprises and how this compares with the state sector is an empirical
question—not a foregone conclusion. There is much variation even
within ownership categories.11 The answers will depend on the data set
in question, including geographic area, time period, measurements used,
and methodology. But it will also depend on the assumptions underpin-
ning the methodology. By choosing to weight the growth of labor and
capital, my approach incorporates more information about how these in-
puts affect growth and productivity in the two sectors. We would not
expect the impact of additional capital on output to be the same in both
sectors. Incorporating this piece of economic information enhances our
understanding of the impact of growth in inputs versus productivity on
China’s development progress.12
Notes
* Penelope B. Prime, ‘‘Industry’s Response to Market Liberalization in
China: Evidence from Jiangsu Province,’’ Economic Development and Cultural
Change 41, no. 1 (October 1992): 27–50. I would like to thank Mary Bumgarner
and John Garver for their thoughts regarding this comment.
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1. Data on state and collective industry were not available for the pre-
reform period.
2. Since both series were available and each has its strengths and problems,
both were used. See the data appendix in Prime, for details on the various adjust-
ments made.
3. With collective employment, figures for 3 of the years were not avail-
able, so interpolation was used. Rural collectives included town and township
enterprises but not village-level enterprises.
4. Gary H. Jefferson, ‘‘Potential Sources of Productivity Growth within
Chinese Industry,’’ World Development 17, no. 1 (1989). Since data collection
and reporting have improved in China since this study was done, it now may be
possible to do more precise estimates for Jiangsu, including adding more refined
input categories.
5. Prime, p. 40.
6. See, e.g., Yuan Peng, ‘‘Capital Formation in Rural Enterprises,’’ in Ru-
ral Enterprises in China, ed. Christopher Findlay, Andrew Watson, and Harry
X. Wu (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 93–116.
7. Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski, and Yuxin Zheng, ‘‘Growth, Ef-
ficiency, and Convergence in China’s State and Collective Industry,’’ Economic
Development and Cultural Change 40 (1992): 239–66.
8. Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski, and Yuxin Zheng, ‘‘Chinese In-
dustrial Productivity: Trends, Measurement Issues, and Recent Developments,’’
Working Paper no. 297 (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics,
Pittsburgh, September 1995), table 5, p. 11.
9. Ibid., pp. 16–21.
10. Samuel P. S. Ho, Rural China in Transition: Nonagricultural Develop-
ment in Rural Jiangsu, 1978–1990 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 48.
11. Jefferson, Rawski, and Zheng, ‘‘Chinese Industrial Productivity,’’ pp.
26, 32.
12. Although not directly relevant to their comment, Zhao and Sommers
note that they could not reproduce my elasticity estimates from table A1. My
colleagues and I reverified my estimates. It should be noted that while I report
the unadjusted capital figures, I always use the revised capital numbers.
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